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Abstract
The move to monetary union in Europe led to convergence of interest rates among the
participating countries. This was associated with notable cross-country differences in the
behaviour of key macroeconomic aggregates. Compared to the low interest rate coun-
tries, former high interest rate countries experienced a boom in domestic demand, a de-
terioration of the current account and appreciation of the real exchange rate. This paper
documents the key stylised facts of this experience and provides a compact two-country
model, based on the Blanchard-Yaari setup, to analyze this phenomenon. This model,
though simple, is able to broadly capture the main qualitative features of the adjustment.
Using this model, we show that the creation of the monetary union leads to an increase in
welfare for all generations in both country groups.
JEL Codes: F36, E21, F32.
Keywords: euro area, interest rate convergence, overlapping generations model.
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Nontechnical Summary
Monetary uniﬁcation led to convergence of interest rates for the participating countries. Con-
comitantly, the behaviour of key macroeconomic variables was starkly contrasting across coun-
tries. Speciﬁcally, it was different between countries with relatively low interest rates prior to
monetary union (core countries) and countries with relatively high interest rates (converging
countries). Compared to the core countries, the latter group of countries experienced a boom in
domestic demand, a deterioration of the current account and real appreciation of their curren-
cies.
To account for these facts we develop a simple (endowment-economy) two-country, two-good
(traded and non-traded) dynamic general equilibrium model. The simple model is capable of
capturing the salient, qualitative features of macroeconomic adjustment. The driver of adjust-
ment is convergence in interest rates between the core (home) and converging (foreign) coun-
tries. Foreign countries experience a sharp increase in household expenditure, accompanied by
a current account deﬁcit and the accumulation of a net debtor position with respect to the home
country. The initial sharp adjustment is followed by a process of slow adjustment, reﬂecting the
evolution of foreign liabilities/assets. In the model the real exchange rate follows the path of
relative aggregate expenditures exactly. Interestingly, the interest rate in the home country, after
an initial jump up, declines gradually over time, moving towards the rate of time preference in
the home country (and away from that in the foreign country), reﬂecting a gradual increase of
the home country’s share in overall wealth.
We show that welfare improves (strictly speaking, does not decline) for all current and future
generations in both the home and foreign country. We ﬁnd that the gains are larger for the
foreign country. We also ﬁnd that the welfare gains increase from one generation to the next.Macroeconomic Adjustment to Monetary Union 3
1. Introduction
The creation of the euro area in 1999, a key landmark in the history of European integration,
is likely to have had important effects on the economies of the participating countries.1 In this
paper, we focus on the macroeconomic implications of one crucial aspect of monetary union,
namely increased ﬁnancial integration. The most obvious manifestation of this integration was
the convergence of short and long-term interest rates to the relatively low levels prevailing in
Germany. Against this background, we address three questions. First, how did the macroeco-
nomic adjustment to monetary union differ between former high-interest rate and low interest
rate countries? Second, can we develop a compact general equilibrium model to account for
these facts? Third, what are the welfare implications of the creation of the monetary union for
the respective countries?
As regards the ﬁrst question, building on our earlier work, (Fagan and Gaspar (2007)), we
try to establish some key stylised facts regarding the macroeconomic effects of interest rate
convergence. We compare the behaviour over time of a series of macroeconomic variables for
two groups of countries: core countries (characterized by low interest rates before participation
in the euro area) and convergence countries (characterized by high interest rates). We use two
complementary methods for this purpose: a graphical comparison of cross-country averages
and the difference-in-difference estimator. On the basis of this analysis, we show that there
were with notable cross-country differences in the behaviour of key macroeconomic aggregates:
domestic demand, current account balances and intra-euro area real exchange rates. Compared
to the core countries, the converging countries experienced a boom in domestic demand, a
deterioration of the current account and appreciation of the real exchange rate. An important
feature, which has a major inﬂuence on our modelling approach, is that the convergence of
interest rates was not associated with signiﬁcant changes in output growth differentials.
Second, we develop a compact two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with a view to
matching these facts2. We focus on an endowment economy setup with two goods (traded and
non-traded). The impulse we consider involves the creation of a monetary union and resulting
ﬁnancial integration of two (groups of) countries which were previously characterised by dif-
ferent levels of domestic interest rates. In our setup, as explained below, the initial difference
in interest rates will be assumed to reﬂect fundamental differences between the two economies,
speciﬁcally differences in the rate of time preference. After the monetary union, a single interest
rate (which may vary over time) exists in the two countries. We then use our model to exam-
ine the macroeconomic affects of interest rate convergence. We will argue that such a simple
framework is capable of capturing most salient, qualitative features of adjustment mentioned in
the previous paragraph.
1 Participation in the monetary union is expected to affect trade and ﬁnancial integration, business cycle synchro-
nization and the patterns of specialization. It could also affect institutions, and the structure and behavior of product
and labor markets (see Lane (2006) and Mongelli and Vega (2006) for comprehensive surveys of the relevant issues
and available evidence).
2 In earlier papers (Fagan and Gaspar (2005) and Fagan and Gaspar (2007)), we developed models to analyse the
effects of interest rate convergence from the perspective of a small open economy entering the monetary union and
experiencing an exogenous permanent fall in interest rates. This approach suffers from a very important limitation:
it assumes that the former high-interest rate countries can be characterised as small open economies within the
euro area. This assumption is strongly counterfactual. In fact, the converging countries account for some 37%
of euro area GDP. Hence, it is clear that signiﬁcant feedback effects cannot be excluded a priori. Moreover, the
adjustment in the countries that previously enjoyed low interest rates is interesting as well.4 Gabriel Fagan, Vitor Gaspar
Third, using the model developed in this paper, we derive the welfare implications of the cre-
ation of the monetary union. We show that the creation of the monetary union is Pareto improv-
ing: all generations in both countries experience a gain in welfare. This reﬂects the fact that
the monetary union represents an expansion of the opportunity sets of all agents in the model.
Using a calibrated version of the model, we ﬁnd that the gains in welfare are greater for later
generations and for agents in the former higher interest rate countries.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review some stylised facts in order to
motivate our analysis. In Section 3, we present our model. Sections 4 and 5 present analytical
resultsfor the model in thecases of ﬁnancial autarkyand monetary unionrespectively. Section 6
presents the results of numerical simulations of the model. In Section 7, we explore the welfare
implications of the creation of the monetary union. Section 8 concludes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some stylized facts in order to
motivate our analysis. In Section 3, we present our model. Sections 4 and 5 present analytical
results for the model in the case respectively of ﬁnancial autarky and monetary union. Section 6
presents the results of numerical simulations of the model. In Section 7, we explore the welfare
implications of the creation of the monetary union while Section 8 concludes.
2. Stylised facts
The establishment of the monetary union in Europe in 1999 was preceded by a process of nom-
inal convergence among the participating countries. In 1996, for example, nominal long term
interest rates ranged from a high of 14.5 percent in Greece to 4.5 percent in Germany. Cur-
rently the spread between the highest and lowest government bond yields is of the order of 30
basis points. Similarly, the highest-lowest spread in short-term interest rates amounted to 10.5
percentage points in 1996. Currently, this spread is effectively zero, reﬂecting the complete
integration of money markets in the euro area. Of course, a signiﬁcant component of the con-
vergence in nominal interest rates across countries reﬂected a convergence of expected inﬂation.
Still, the evidence shows that real interest rates were also signiﬁcantly affected (see Charts 1 to
3). Broadly speaking it may be said that monetary uniﬁcation was associated with convergence
of ﬁnancial conditions across member states.
What were the economic effects of the decline in interest rates differentials (or of the conver-
gence of ﬁnancial conditions) on the relative behaviour of the countries concerned? Clearly
there are too many factors, some country-speciﬁc, varying over time to be able to conclude
much from individual country data unless a detailed modelling structure is employed3. Key
macroeconomic variables in each of the countries were affected by a host of speciﬁc shocks,
including common shocks emanating from the global environment (e.g. changes in world de-
mand, world interest rates and oil prices) as well as country-speciﬁc shocks. A more promising
approach is to look at differentials in the behaviour of variables across countries over time.
However, differentials across country pairs would still be affected by country-speciﬁc shocks,
so it is difﬁcult to identify the effect of the shock in this manner. However, taking (simple) av-
erages of the country pairs should reduce the importance of country-speciﬁc factors and offers
some chance of highlighting the common adjustment mechanism. Following our earlier work
3 Using a DSGE model, Langedijk and Roeger (2007) examine the experience of 6 euro area countries - Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands - in the early years of EMU. They ﬁnd that a large part of the
divergence between these countries can be explained by the one-off effects of EMU entry, particularly increased
ﬁnancial integration and interest rate convergence.Macroeconomic Adjustment to Monetary Union 5
(Fagan and Gaspar (2007)) we start by separating the euro area countries into two groups on
the basis of the relative nominal and real interest rates prevailing in the mid 1990s. The ﬁrst
group comprises low interest rate countries Germany, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and
Austria4. In common with the usual parlance, we denote this group as the core countries. The
second group comprises countries which, initially, had relatively high interest rates: Spain, Ire-
land, Italy and Portugal5. We call this group the converging countries. We calculate, for each
economic variable, a pair of time series based on arithmetic (equally weighted) averages within
the groups. Then, with a view to controlling for the possible effects of common shocks across
all countries, we compare the differences across these averaged country groups. We display the
results graphically.
We complement this graphical approach with a more rigorous method. Speciﬁcally, we employ
a difference-in-difference estimator. This method is often used to study the impacts of one-
off events, such as a medical treatments or the effects of speciﬁc policies, such as training
programmes (Ashenfelter (1978)) or minimum wages (Card and Krueger (1994)).
The idea is that we have data on two periods (the pre-EMU and the post-EMU periods) for
two groups of countries (the converging and the core group). By comparing the change in
the difference between the two groups of countries over the two periods one may derive an
estimate of the differential effect of participation in the euro area on the two country groups.
The null hypothesis in this approach is that in the absence of the ﬁnancial integration shock,
the key macro variables in both groups would have followed identical trends. In our context,
the difference-in-difference estimate of the differential effect of interest rate convergence is
obtained from the following regression on annual data over the period 1995 to 2005:
yi;t = ®0 + ®1Dt + ®2Gi + ®3Dt ¤ Gi
Here yit denotes an observation on the value of a variable of interest in country i in period t
(e.g. the current account-GDP ratio of Germany in 1997). Dt is a dummy variable taking on a
value of 1 for the EMU period (t>1998) and 0 for the pre-EMU period. Gi is a dummy variable
taking on a value of 1 if the country i is a member of the converging group and zero for the
core group. If entry into the euro area was not associated with difference in the behaviour of
the macroeconomic variables in the two country groups, then we would expect the coefﬁcient
®3 to be not signﬁcantly different from zero. An estimate of ®3 signiﬁcantly different from zero
is consistent with interest rate convergence being associated with differential behaviour across
the country groups. Estimates of ®3 for a number of key macroeconomic variables and their
associated t-ratios are presented in Table 1.
Clearly the sample size in this exercise is small, so the usual caveats apply both to the graphical
and to the difference-in-difference estimates. Nonetheless, we believe that taking this perspec-
tive on the data does yield some useful insights into the macroeconomic effects of the interest
rate convergence process.
4 We do not include Luxembourg in our analysis due to difﬁculties with data availability.
5 We do not include Greece in this latter group since it entered the euro area only in 2001, some two years later
than the other countries. We have replicated the analysis including Greece in the converging group. We ﬁnd that
the conclusions derived in this section are not sensitive to the exclusion of Greece. Details are available on request
from the authors. In addition, we do not include Finland in either group. This reﬂects the fact that it only joined
the EU in 1994 and the evolution of its economy over part of the period under review is heavily distorted by special
factors (such as the recovery from the sharp recession recorded in the early 1990s).6 Gabriel Fagan, Vitor Gaspar
Details on the sources of the data used in the analysis are presented in Appendix I.
We focus on ﬁve key stylised facts which result from this analysis.6
As is clear from inspection of Charts 1 to 3 and also from the ﬁrst three rows of Table 1 nominal
and real interest rates declined in converging countries relative to core countries.
We may summarize these remarks as our ﬁrst stylized fact (see Charts 1,2, and 3):
(1) There was a sizeable convergence of interest rates between the two groups of countries.
We will take interest rate convergence as the impulse triggering subsequent adjustment.
Turning to output, over the whole period, GDP growth was around 1 percentage point higher in
the converging countries than in the core group. However, growth differentials tended to narrow
to levels which were low by historical standards. On the surface, this evidence suggests that the
process of interest rate convergence has had little impact on output growth differentials (Chart
4). This result is conﬁrmed by the difference-in-difference analysis: the estimated coefﬁcient
has a negative sign and it is insigniﬁcant. The result is also conﬁrmed by a number of studies
of growth differentials in the euro area (see, for example, Benalal et al. (2006) and ECB (2007)
for a review of the evidence on output growth differentials within the euro area). In any case,
the absence of statistically signiﬁcant effects on overall growth differentials suggests that it is
justiﬁable to look at intertemporal adjustment patterns in endowment economy models. It is
interesting to note en passant that the differential impact of euro area participation, across the
two groups of countries, is signiﬁcant for housing investment, while for non-housing investment
it is not (Table 1). We thus have our second stylized fact:
(2) There is no evidence of signiﬁcant effects on GDP growth differentials.
There is a substantial difference in the behaviour of household expenditure across the two
groups of countries. Compared to the core countries, the household savings ratio fell more
rapidly in the converging countries (Chart 5), although this effect is not signiﬁcant. In addition,
housing investment (as a percentage of GDP) rose in the converging countries while falling in
the core countries (Chart 6), and this difference is found to be statistically signiﬁcant. This dif-
ferential pattern in household expenditures is clearly reﬂected in a different pattern in household
net lending, which declined sharply in the converging countries compared to the core countries
(Chart 7), a phenomenon also found to be statistically signiﬁcant. From Chart 8 it is also ap-
parent that the household debt ratio of converging countries increased rapidly, approaching the
levels prevailing in the core countries. Household debt also increased in the latter group of
countries, albeit at a much slower pace.
(3) Household expenditures behaved very differently in the two groups of countries. In relative
terms, converging countries experienced a boom in expenditures leading to a decline in their
net lending, and a more rapid buildup in debt, relative to the core countries.
6 The choice of these facts reﬂects our earlier work (Fagan and Gaspar (2007)). In that paper, we documented a
number of additional facts not discussed here. In particular, we found that while there were differences in non-
housing investment across the two country groups, these were not as prominent in the case of housing investment
and consumption. Second, on average there was little difference in the paths of the ﬁscal deﬁcits between the two
country groups.Macroeconomic Adjustment to Monetary Union 7
Given the sharp increase in private domestic expenditure in converging countries, relative to
historical trends and the muted response of output it is not surprising that a visible change
occurred in the external balances of these countries. As can be seen in Chart 10 net foreign
assets in the core countries exhibited a mild upward trend over the period, consistent with the
moderate increase in their current account surplus shown in Chart 9. In contrast the current
account of converging countries moved towards a signiﬁcant deﬁcit. Such trend, in turn, led to
the accumulation of a signiﬁcant foreign debtor position (Chart 6). This evidence is consistent
with the work of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), who also found that the increased ﬁnancial
integration in Europe, including the creation of the euro area, was associated with increasing
dispersion of current account balances.The visual impression is conﬁrmed by the difference-in-
differences estimator (Table 1), allowing us to conclude that:
(4) Current accounts balances behaved very differently across the two country groups, with the
core countries experiencing a broadly stable position over the period while the convergence
countries experienced a sharp deterioration. This led to divergent patterns in the accumulation
of net foreign assets.
Chart 12 shows clear relative consumer price convergence of converging countries towards lev-
els prevailing in core countries. Again, the difference in difference estimates conﬁrm that the
real appreaciation (measured by relative consumer prices) is signiﬁcant (Table 1):
(5) Converging countries recorded real appreciation vis-a-vis the core group as captured, for
example, by the relative behaviour of consumer prices.
From this brief review of the stylised facts four striking features emerge regarding the different
behaviour of the two groups of countries following the creation of the monetary union. First,
contrary to what one might expect, there appears to have been little noticeable or statistically
signiﬁcant effect on output growth differentials (or non-housing investment). Second, the pat-
ternofhouseholdspendingandlendingisstrikinglydifferentacrossthetwogroupsofcountries,
with converging countries experiencing a strong boom in domestic expenditures (and house-
hold indebtedness) compared to the core group. Third, reﬂecting the previous two facts, the
current account balances and accumulation of net foreign assets behaved very differently, with
the converging countries experiencing a marked deterioration in their current account balances
compared to a broadly stable situation in the core group. Fourth, the behaviour of intra-euro
area real exchange rates is striking, with the converging countries experiencing a notable real
exchange rate appreciation vis-?-vis the core group.
Is it possible to explain these facts regarding the different behaviour between the two groups
using a two-country intertemporal general equilibrium model? And what are the welfare im-
plications for the respective countries. In the remainder of the paper we address both of these
questions.
3. The two-country general equilibrium model
We model the macroeconomic effects of ﬁnancial integration using a two-country, two-good en-
dowment economy model with household sectors modelled along the lines of Blanchard (1985)
and Yaari (1965). Our choice of this framework reﬂects our reading of the stylised facts given
above.8 Gabriel Fagan, Vitor Gaspar
First, up to now output growth differentials do not appear to be a major part of the story of
adjustment to the euro. Thus the use of an endowment setup, which obviously has the advantage
of simplicity, can be justiﬁed. The analysis we perform for the endowment economy with
non-traded goods is very much in the spirit of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004). They also use a
endowment economy framework, with traded and non-traded goods to discuss the real exchange
rate implications of changing global expenditure patterns.
Second, movements in real exchange rates appear to have been an important feature of the
adjustment. To tackle this issue, clearly we need a framework with (at least) two sectors.
Third, within our framework, we assume that the pre-integration difference in interest rates is
due to differences in the rates of time preference across countries. This latter assumption con-
trasts with the main alternative approach to modelling the macroeconomic effects of ﬁnancial
integration, such as that employed by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006). In that approach it is as-
sumed that pre-integration interest rate differentials reﬂect differences in initial capital-output
ratios and thus the process of ﬁnancial integration leads to a ﬂow of capital into the higher inter-
est rate country which leads to an equalisation of capital-output ratios and interest rates across
countries . Our approach of assuming differences in the rate of time preference across countries
is motivated by three considerations. First, it is of itself interesting to examine what happens
when countries characterised by a deep structural difference such as differences in the rate of
time preference experience ﬁnancial integration. Second, the stylised fact that the creation of
the monetary union has not been associated with changes in growth differentials suggests that
ﬂows of capital and resulting changes in capital-output ratios have not been, to date, a major
part of the story as far as the euro area is concerned. Third, this assumption can be seen as
a simpliﬁcation, which we view as proxying for a range of factors - e.g. differences in credit
frictions and difference in policy credibility - which account for the initial difference in interest
rates observed in the data7.
Finally, the choice of a Blanchard-Yaari setup guarantees a well deﬁned steady state for a ﬁnan-
cially integrated economy in the face of differences in the rate of time preference.
We consider the creation of a monetary union between two (groups of) countries which, prior
to the creation of the monetary union, experienced different levels of nominal and real interest
rates. The ﬁrst group, which we will henceforth call the home country (corresponding to the
core group in the previous section), comprises the countries which, prior to the creation of
the monetary union, experienced relatively low interest rates. The second group, which we
will call the foreign country, consists of the former high interest rate countries. We do not
consider production, so we focus on an endowment economy setting. We use the H-superscript
to denote home country variables and the F-superscript for foreign variables. Consumers in the
home country receive a ﬂow endowment of a tradeable good, !H, and a nontradeable good, ´H.
Similarly, in the foreign country the consumers receive !F and ´F. The size of endowments
are constant across time but may differ across countries, reﬂecting differences in country size.
Both countries contain a set of Blanchard-Yaari consumers. We will assume that the death rate
½ is common across countries. We further assume that the population is constant across time,
and for convenience, normalised to unity in both countries, and hence the birth rate is equal
to the death rate. Reﬂecting the data for the euro area, we allow the economies to differ in
7 In the context of our model, it also allows us to match two facts which are observed in the data for the euro area
countries before the start of the monetary union: 1) real interest rates differed across countries and 2) net foreign
assets were close to zero.Macroeconomic Adjustment to Monetary Union 9
size, reﬂected in differences in the size of the endowments across countries. However, in the
interest of simplicity, we assume that, apart from the rate of time preference, all of the remaining
parameters are the same across countries.
To examine the impact of monetary union, we follow Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006). in assum-
ing that, initially, the countries are ﬁnancially autarkic, neither lending or borrowing to each
other. In our setting initial steady state interest rates differ across the two countries reﬂecting
different rates of time preference. The creation of a monetary union brings this autarkic situa-
tion to an end and the associated ﬁnancial integration means that a single common interest rate
prevails in the two countries from the moment of its inception8. This single interest rate will be
an endogenous variable to be determined along with foreign assets/liabilities and consumption
paths in both countries. As we will see below, the creation of a monetary union leads to a new
steady-state interest rate and NFA position, but also to interesting transitional dynamics.
3.1 A representative household intertemporal problem
We start by writing down the problem of a representative household of cohort t in either of
the countries. Since the problem is symmetric in the home and foreign country, we do not
need to employ H and F superscripts. As in all standard applications of theory, households will
maximize their expected utility. In our setting, with two goods and logarithmic preferences,






















where t and s denote time, cT
t and cN
t denote respectively the consumption of traded and non-
traded goods, µ is the subjective discount factor while · is a parameter used for nomalisation
purposes. Since, in the model, the only uncertainty pertains to the timing of death the objective








log(cs)exp(¡(µ + ½)(s ¡ t))ds:
8 In simulating the model, the creation of the monetary union is modelled as an unanticipated shock. While this is
obviously a simpliﬁcation, it is worth noting that the interest rate convergence which occurred in Europe happened
rather quickly. Moreover, contemporary calculations based on bond yields indicate that, as late as 1996, markets
assessed the probability of some converging countries entering the monetary union in 1999 as being below 50%
(see, for example, Bates (1999) and Favero et al. (2000)).10 Gabriel Fagan, Vitor Gaspar
Each household faces a budget constraint, which we may write in the form of accumulation of
assets or, if negative, debts. Speciﬁcally:
dft
dt
= (rt + ½)ft + p
T
t (! ¡ c
T
t ) + p
N
t (´ ¡ c
N
t ):
! and ´ denote the ﬂow endowments of traded and nontraded goods, respectively. The budget
equation is intuitive. The individual household accumulates assets in accordance with (i) the
private rate of return on past assets, given by the sum of the interest rate with the compensation
for the probability of death; and (ii) the difference between the value of its endowment ﬂows
and consumption expenditure. Note that in this setting the interest rate faced by the household
can vary over time.
In what follows we will let pT be the numeraire and set it to 1. Letting zt denote nominal con-
sumption, i.e. zt = cT +pN
t cN
t , we can express the standard intratemporal ﬁrst order conditions
for cTand cN as:
c
T






t = (1 ¡ ®)zt (3.2)
These expressions enable us to deﬁne a dual price index for aggregate consumption, pt
9 so that
zt = ptct. The budget constraint then becomes:
dft
dt
= (rt + ½)ft + ! + p
N
t ´ ¡ zt
Applying the maximum principle to solve the consumer’s optimisation problem, we obtain the
following Euler equation for nominal consumer expenditure:
_ zt = (rt ¡ µ)zt (3.3)
Solving this Euler equation subject to the budget constraint gives the following “solved out”
consumption function:
zt = (µ + ½)(ft + xt)
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Here ¹ r(s;t) denotes the average interest rate between periods t and s (see, for example, Barro
and Sala-I-Martin (2003)). The consumption function tells us that current nominal consump-
tion is a function of the discounted nominal value of lifetime resources, where the discounting
takes place with respect to the sum of the nominal interest rate and the death rate. Given our
demographic assumptions, the consumption function and asset accumulation equation can be
aggregated across consumers. The aggregate consumption function is:












The corresponding equation of motion for the aggregate foreign asset position is:
dFt
dt
= rtFt + ! ¡ ®Zt
In deriving the latter equation we have used the ﬁrst order intratemporal condition for nontraded
goods together with the market clearing condition for nontraded goods: CN
t = ´. Note that in
our setup, an endowment economy without capital and storage possibilities, economywide as-
sets are the assets-liabilities with respect to the rest of the word. Note also, that the death rate
does not appear in the aggregate asset accumulation equation. In addition, from the intratem-
poral ﬁrst order condition for nontraded goods (3.2), we can show that the nontraded price is a







Substituting this expression into the formula for the dual price index and noting that the price
of traded goods is normalised to unity, we can show that the consumer price index is a mono-















Finally, noting that nominal consumption is given by Zt = PtCt, we can also show that real
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3.2 The dynamics of the aggregate economy
As noted above, the optimisation problems faced by consumers in the home and foreign coun-
tries are symmetric, so we can use the results derived in the previous section to describe the
equations of motion for the two countries. Let superscript-H denote a variable for the home
country and superscript-F the corresponding foreign country variable. Then using our previ-
ous results and differentiating with respect to time, we can show that the evolution of the two
economies is governed by the following four equations:
_ Z
H




H + ½)Ft (3.7)
_ Z
F




F + ½)Ft (3.8)











The ﬁrst three equations are the standard in the open economy Blanchard-Yaari setup (see, for
example, Blanchard and Fisher (1989)). The last equation is a condition for equilibrium in the
global market for traded goods. It makes use of the intratemporal ﬁrst order condition for traded
goods consumption (3.1) and the normalization of the price of traded goods to unity.
In what follows, we will assume, as noted above, that foreign consumers are more impatient
than home consumers. This implies that their rate of time preference is higher: µF > µH. We
will also use the convention that Ft measures the net foreign assets of the home consumers (a
positive value means that they have positive net assets). Of course, with this convention, Ft
denotes the net foreign liabilities for the foreigners.
With this apparatus in place, we are now in a position to examine the behaviour of the two
economies. We start with an initial condition of ﬁnancial autarky and then look at what happens
following the creation of the monetary union, reﬂected in the common interest rate across both
countries.
4. Financial autarky
Under autarky, Ft = 0 for all t, i.e. no international borrowing and lending takes place. We see









Thus the interest rates are different across countries, with rF > rH. Under autarky, the con-
sumers in each country consume their endowments of traded and nontraded goods in each pe-
riod, foreign lending and borrowing is zero and interest rates differ across countries.Macroeconomic Adjustment to Monetary Union 13
5. Monetary union







where rt is the area-wide interest rate. Note that rt is now an endogenous variable and that - at
least in the transition to the steady state - it will vary over time, hence the t-subscript.
The four equations (3.7) to (3.10) together with the initial condition, F0 = 0 and the transver-
sality conditions determine the time paths of the four endogenous variables fZH
t ;ZF
t ;Ft;rtg.
Differentiating (3.10) with respect to time implies:
_ Z
H
t + _ Z
F
t = 0 (5.11)























Thus, at every point in time, the (time-varying) interest rate is equal to a weighted average of
the rates of time preference at home and abroad, with the weights being given by the respective
shares in world consumption of traded goods, plus a term in net foreign assets. It is worthwhile
to interpret the result carefully. The interest rate must be compatible with unchanging world
consumption of tradable goods. It is useful to start disregarding the last term in the equation.
Such a simpliﬁcation would be exact if net foreign assets were zero, the birth (and death) rate
wasnilorµF = µH. Hence, undersuchconditions, theinterestratewouldbeaweightedaverage
of the subjective rates, with the weights given by the respective weights of world expenditure
(as stated above). However, our simplifying assumptions don’t hold true in general. Why does
it make a difference? In the Blanchard-Yaari set-up the expenditure proﬁle, over time, is the
same for all households. Nevertheless, the aggregate time proﬁle is affected by the arrival of
newborns. They affect average expenditure because, by assumption, they are born without
assets (or debts). Therefore, they have a lower (higher) expenditure level than the average
in the economy. The difference, relative to the respective average, is ¡(µH + ½)Ft for the
home country newborns and (µF + ½)Ft for the foreign country newborns, since (µi + ½);i =
H;F is the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. In both cases their weight in the
overall population is given by the birth rate ½. The impact on expenditure is, thus, ¡½(µH ¡
µF)®Ft. Since µF > µH the term within brackets is negative. As Ft increases over time, the
equilibrium interest rate becomes lower than the consumption-weighted average of the rates of
time preference.
From (5.12)we see straight away that the initial interest rate, r0, following the creation of the
monetary union, must lie between the interest rates which prevailed in the two countries. We
see this by noting that at this point, let us say t = 0 , we have by assumption F0 = 0. The
equation then implies that µH < r0 < µF.14 Gabriel Fagan, Vitor Gaspar
Using (3.10) to eliminate ZF













F) ¡ ½Ft (5.13)




















F) + ½Ft (5.15)
These equations show us that once we know the paths F and r, we can determine the paths of
nominal consumption in both countries. Once we know the paths of ZHand ZFwe can also
derive for each country paths for nontraded goods prices, the consumer price indices and real
consumption using the expressions (3.4),(3.5) and (3.6) given earlier.
By a process of repeated substitution in (3.7) to (3.10), we can reduce the model to a pair of
(nonlinear) differential equations in F and r.












+ (rt ¡ µ
H ¡ ®½)(rt ¡ µ
F) ¡
®(µH ¡ µF)½2(1 ¡ ®)
(!H + !F)
Ft (5.17)
F is a predetermined variable while r is a jump variable. The pair of equations can be solved
numerically by using standard two-point boundary techniques.
5.1 The steady state of the monetary union
Although our primary interest is in the shorter term dynamic adjustment to the creation of the
monetary union, we present in this section the key features of the (post monetary union) steady
state. This is given by the ﬁxed point of equations (5.16) and (5.17). Deﬁne the weighted
average of the rates of time preference (rav) with the weights being given by the relative sizes





Now, letting a bar over a variable denote the steady state, we show in Appendix II that:
µ
H < ¹ r < r
av < µ
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and
¹ F > 0
In words, the steady-state interest rate lies between the interest rates that prevailed in the home
and foreign countries prior to the monetary union. In fact the interval is narrower: the steady-
state interest rate is lower than an endowment weighted average of the initial interest rates. In
addition, the net foreign asset position of the home country is positive, compared with the initial
value of zero, implying that it becomes a net creditor. In the appendix, we also establish the
following facts about the post monetary union steady state relative to the initial autarkic steady
state:
1. both nominal and real consumption in the home country are higher;
2. both nominal and real consumption in the foreign country are lower;
3. the price of nontraded goods in the home country is higher and (since the price of traded
goods is the numeraire) the overall consumer price index is higher.
4. the price of nontraded goods in the foreign country is lower as is the consumer price
index.
5.2 Transition paths
To explore the dynamics, we linearise (5.16) and (5.17) around the new steady state to obtain:







_ rt = ¡
µ
®(µH ¡ µF)½2(1 ¡ ®)
!H + !F
¶
~ Ft + (2¹ r ¡ ½ ¡ µ
H ¡ µ
F)~ rt (5.19)
where a bar over a variable denotes the steady-state value while a tilde denotes a deviation
from steady state. Saddle path stability requires that this system has one root with positive real
parts and one root with negative real parts. This requires that the determinant of the associated
matrix is negative. A sufﬁcient condition for this to be the case is that ¹ r <
µH+µF+½
2 , which
is likely to be the case in practice. We will assume that this condition is always satisﬁed for
the relevant range of parameters we are interested in (and of course we verify this in numerical
implementations). The phase diagram of the system is presented in Figure 1.
We note that the locus _ F = 0 is downward sloping in F-r space and it can easily be shown that
the saddle path is less steeply sloped10. The _ r = 0 locus is upward sloping and, for reasonable
parameter values, almost a vertical line.
Following the creation of the monetary union, the interest rate jumps to a new level lying be-
tween the interest rates that prevailed in the two countries prior to the union. Since the level of
10 Details available from the authors on request.16 Gabriel Fagan, Vitor Gaspar
foreign assets is predetermined, the economy jumps to the point (A) on the saddle path associ-
ated with the initial interest rate r0.
We can now establish that this initial interest rate is higher then the weighted average rate rav.
To see this, note from (5.16), that if r0 were equal to rav, given the initial value of F0 = 0,
then _ F would be zero. This corresponds to point (C) on the phase diagram. At this point,
countries would be neither lending to (or borrowing from) each other. Consumption in both
countries would be equal to pre-EMU levels, with consumers in each country consuming their
endowments. This point cannot be an equilibrium since it does not lie on the saddle path. The
equilibrium point on the saddle path (point (A)) lies to the right of it. This gives us one key
result for the dynamics. Initially, following the creation of the EMU, the common interest rate
lies above the weighted average of the rates of time preference.
Thereafter, foreign assets/debt rise gradually while the interest rate falls as the economy con-
verges to its new steady state (B), characterised by a positive level of foreign assets for the home
country and r < ravas described in Section 5.1.
The time paths of the remaining variables can be derived in a straightforward manner. It is easy
to establish that nominal consumption in the home country jumps down on impact. To see this,
note that (1) at r0 = rav, nominal consumption would equal the pre-EMU level; (2) in fact, as
shown above, r0 > rav; and (3) the partial derivative of ZH with respect to rt is negative, as
shown in (5.14). These three facts imply that the initial level of home consumption following
the monetary union is lower than the pre-EMU level. The same applies to real consumption, the
nontraded price and the consumer price index since all three of these variables are increasing
in ZH, see (3.4) to (3.6). In particular, there is a decline in the real exchange rate, on impact,
in line with the stylized facts reported in Section 2. All of these variables then monotonically
increase to new steady state levels, higher than the initial (pre-EMU) steady-state.
The corresponding variables for the foreign country mirror those of the home country but with
the opposite sign. Nominal and real consumption in the foreign country jump up on impact
and then gradually decline to new, lower, steady-state levels. Prices also move accordingly. In
particular, there is an appreciation of the real exchange rate on impact.
With total resources ﬁxed by our endowment assumption, the divergent shifts in domestic de-
mand give rise to movements in the current account balance and set in train an accumulation
of foreign assets/liabilities. The home country moves into surplus (and the foreign country into
deﬁcit). These current account imbalances are gradually eliminated as the economies converge
to the new steady-state foreign asset/debt ratios. At the same time, the divergent movements in
prices imply that the foreign country initially experiences a real appreciation before gradually
converging to a steady state characterised by a lower real exchange rate.
To summarize, our model predicts the following features following the creation of the monetary
union. First, there are divergent movements in nominal and real consumption in the two areas,
with the foreign country experiencing an initial boom compared to the home country. Second,
this movement in demand leads to the emergence of current account imbalances, with the for-
eign country experiencing a deﬁcit vis-a-vis the home country. Finally, the foreign country
experiences an initial real appreciation vis-a-vis the home country. In qualitative terms, this is
fully in line with the stylised facts for the euro area countries outlined in Section 2.Macroeconomic Adjustment to Monetary Union 17
6. A numerical example
Inorder tofurtherillustratetheworkingsofthemodel, wenowpresenttheresultsofa numerical
simulation of the model.11 We consider the case of two (groups of) countries: the core (home)
and converging (foreign) countries. We calibrate the model as follows. !His set to 0.65, the
share of the core countries in euro area GDP while !Fis set to 0.35. We assume that the share of
traded consumption in total consumption (®) is 0.33 in both countries, consistent with available
input-output evidence for the euro area. The traded goods price is the numeraire in both counties
and is set to unity. We also assume for convenience that the initial nontraded price in both
countries is unity. This then gives us implied values for the nontraded goods endowments ´H
and ´F. The mortality rate, ½, is set to 0.02 per annum, corresponding to a life expectancy of
50 years, a standard value in these models. Given our assumption of constant population, the
mortality rate is equal to the birth rate. µHis set to 0.04 while µFis set at 0.05. Initially, under
autarky, these parameters imply that the interest rates in the home and foreign country are 4%
and 5% respectively. In the initial steady state, consumption in both countries is thus equal to
the country-speciﬁc endowments.
The response of the variables to the creation of a monetary union is shown in Figures 2 which
(except for interest rates, current account balances and net foreign assets) shows the percentage
difference from the pre-EMU steady state. On impact, the interest rate jumps to a common level
of 4.4%. Real consumption in the core countries jumps down by 2% on impact while consump-
tion in the converging countries jumps up by 4%. These shifts in relative domestic demand are
associated with the emergence of current account imbalances with the current account balance
of the core countries moving to an initial surplus of 2 percent of GDP (and an associated deﬁcit
in the converging countries of 4 percent of GDP - the differences in the numbers reﬂecting
differences in the size of the economies). Thereafter, as the converging countries accumulate
foreign debt, their consumption declines gradually to a new level some 15% below the autarkic
steady-state value. Correspondingly consumption in the core countries rises to a new steady-
state level, higher than the autarkic value. The patterns of relative demand are associated with
notable movements in cross-country relative prices. Nontraded prices in the converging coun-
tries jump up by 12% while in the home countries, nontraded prices fall by 7% on impact. The
real exchange rate of the converging countries - measured by relative consumer prices - experi-
ences a sharp initial appreciation of the order of 20%. Thereafter, there is a slow convergence of
prices to the new steady state, characterised by higher nontraded prices in the home country and
lower nontraded prices in the converging countries. The common interest rate gradually rises
to a new steady-state value, lying, as demonstrated in the previous section, below the weighted
average of the two autarkic rates. Overall, since the graphs are in annual terms, it is clear that
the convergence to the steady state is very slow.
7. Some welfare implications
In the overlapping generations setup which we have employed here, the computation of aggre-
gate welfare and changes therein is more complicated than in the usual case of inﬁnitely-lived
agents. This stems from the fact that, in order to derive a social welfare function, the welfare of
the different past and future generations need to be aggregated using some weighting scheme.
One prominent example of such a scheme is the time-consistent approach of Calvo and Obst-
feld (1988). As it happens, in the context of the example considered in this paper, we can derive
11 To solve the nonlinear differential equations we use the standard Matlab function (BVP4C)18 Gabriel Fagan, Vitor Gaspar
strong welfare conclusions without recourse to the device of constructing such a social welfare
function.
In fact, it can be easily established that the welfare of all currently alive and future generations
in both countries rises (or more speciﬁcally does not decline) as a result of the creation of the
monetary union. This can be seen by means of the following ’revealed-preference’ argument.
Given our assumptions, set out earlier, in the pre-EMU steady state each agent in the economy
consumes his own endowment bundle in each period and country and agents do not engage
in borrowing or lending. Now, following the creation of the monetary union, this consumption
path - consuming the endowment each period - remains feasible. However, agents in fact choose
different paths for consumption. Since the agents are choosing consumption paths to maximise
their welfare and they have perfect foresight, we can conclude that the introduction of the mon-
etary union does not reduce the welfare of any currently alive or future generation compared
with the pre-EMU situation. In short, the creation of the monetary union and the associated
ﬁnancial integration expands the opportunity set of all agents in the economy. This enables
agents to derive gains from the possibility to engage in intertemporal trade (which previously
was not available) and thus leads to an improvment in (or at least no loss of) welfare. This is a
standard result, which is, for example, discussed in detail in Chapter 1 of Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1996). As we shall see below, while all generations gain from monetary union, the extent of
the gain differs across generations and across countries.
In order to illustrate this point numerically, we compute for different representative generations
in each country, the welfare that obtains under EMU compared to the welfare for the same agent
that would prevail under ﬁnancial autarky. For this purpose, we use the same parameters which
were employed in the previous section. Speciﬁcally, for an agent born in period v, we solve for






where cv;s denotes the consumption of an agent born in period v in period t.
In the autarkic steady state, consumption is equal to the (constant) endowment of traded and
non-traded goods each period and, the welfare of the home and foreign consumer is given by
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Note that under our assumptions, within each country welfare is the same across generations
under autarky. This is our baseline case.
Now we consider what happens when, from period t = 0 onwards, a monetary union exists.
For any generation, alive at time 0 or born subsequently, in either country we can calculate
welfare by deriving the time path for the generation’s consumption and calculating the value of
the integral in (7.20)12. We repeat this process for different generations in the two countries.
Before presenting the results, it is important to note that given our assumptions about demo-
graphics and consumption in the pre-EMU state, the optimisation problem facing agents of
generation 0 will be identical to that of all previous generations currently alive in the economy
in period 0. This reﬂects the fact that they all have the same life expectancy, the same endow-
ment bundle and the same initial stock of ﬁnancial assets (namely zero). Thus the results for
this generation will also show us the welfare gains for all individuals alive at the time when the
monetary union was created.
In order to present the results in an easily interpretable form, we express the gains in welfare
in terms of the equivalent percentage difference in annual consumption necessary to yield the
same level of welfare in the pre and post-EMU situations. This is given by:
(µ + ½)(WEMU ¡ WA)
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 2, which shows results for the generations
alive on the date of the creation of the monetary union (denoted ¡1 to 0 in the Table) and
5, 10, 20, 50 and 100 years afterwards. The row labelled 1 refers to the welfare gains of an
individual born in the steady state of the monetary union. The table shows us the percentage
increase in annual consumption which would be needed without EMU in order to yield the same
level of lifetime utility to the agent as under EMU. For example, for the generation of agents
born on date 0 in the foreign country, the lifetime gain in welfare is equivalent to a permanent
increase of 0.19% in consumption.
We observe the following features. First, the welfare of all generations in both countries in-
creases as a result of the creation of the monetary union, in line with the revealed preference
argument given above. Second, welfare gains tend to be larger in the foreign than in the home
country. Third, the gains in welfare are larger for later generations and become very sizeable
for the later generations in the foreign country. The latter two features deserve some comment.
Intuitively, the size of the welfare gains for any generation depends on how large the difference
in the ’average’ real interest rate facing a typical member of that generation over its expected
lifetime is from what would have prevailed without the EMU. By way of illustration, the last
two columns in Table 2 show the average real interest rate expected to prevail over the lifetime
of different generations13. From the results in the previous sections, we know that the gap be-
12 The time path of individual consumption depends on aggregate variables (the interest rate and the price of non-
traded goods). To derive a functional expression for consumption, we substitute the aggregate variables in the
individual consumer’s problem by using the linear approximations given by the solution of the linearised model.
Solving the consumer’s problem with this substitution then gives us an expression for the individual’s consumption
as function of time. Standard numerical integration algorithms can then be employed to calculate welfare. In fact,
we calculate the integral using Gaussian quadrature with the standard Matlab function quadl.
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tween the actual real interest rate and the pre-EMU interest rates is larger for the foreign than
the home country. (This of course partly reﬂects our assumptions on the relative size of the two
countries.) Therefore, for any given generation, the welfare gains will be larger for the foreign
than the home country.
Let us now consider explicitly the inﬂuence of consumer inﬂation on the real interest rate in
each country. In the foreign country the real interest rate will be declining over time. The
decline results from both a fall in the nominal interest rate and an increase in inﬂation (or, more
precisely, a gradual fall to zero in the rate of deﬂation). Hence the gap with the pre-EMU rate
will increase over time. This implies that generations in the foreign country which are born later
will experience larger welfare gains than generations born earlier. For the home country, the
real interest rate is rising slightly over time (reﬂecting the offsetting effect of a falling nominal
interest rate and declining inﬂation, with the latter dominating). Hence the gap with the pre-
EMU real rate will also increase for the home country. Therefore, also here, generations born
later will experience higher welfare gains than earlier generations14.
8. Conclusion
The move to monetary union led to interest rate convergence among the participating coun-
tries. Interestingly, this convergence was associated with sharp differences in the behaviour of
macroeconomic variables between two groups of countries: core countries (Germany and coun-
tries closely associated with Germany, such as Belgim, the Netherlands, France, Luxembourg
and Austria) and converging countries (Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal). The difference is
that the former group enjoyed relatively low interest rates prior to monetary uniﬁcation.
We documented a number of key stylized facts regarding the macroeconomic effects of this
interestrateconvergence. Wethenproceededtodevelopasimpletwo-country, two-good(traded
and non-traded) dynamic general equilibrium model to explain these facts. We used this model
to derive a number of normative implications regarding the welfare effects of the monetary
union.
We showed that there were notable cross-country differences in the behaviour of key macroe-
conomic aggregates: domestic demand, current account balances and intra-euro area real ex-
change rates. Compared to the core countries, the converging countries experienced a boom in
domestic demand (principally reﬂecting higher household expenditures), a deterioration of the
current account and an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Interestingly, the convergence of
interest rates does not seem to have been associated with signiﬁcant changes in output growth
differentials.
The simple model that we develop is capable of capturing most salient, qualitative features of
adjustment. Speciﬁcally, in the two-country, two-goods endowment economy, the convergence
ininterestratesresultingfromthemonetaryunionleadstonotabledifferencesinexpendituresin
the two country groups, with former high interest rate countries experiencing a sharp increase
in household expenditure, accompanied by a current account deﬁcit and the accumulation of
a debtor position vis-a-vis the remaining countries. This is followed by a slow process of
adjustment to a new steady state in which consumption is lower (higher) in the high interest rate
14 In our setting, as discussed in Section 5.2, there is a discontinuous decrease (increase) in consumer prices in the
home (foreign) country. If we considered habit formation (as in Fagan and Gaspar (2007)), the dynamics of the
real exchange rate would include an initial gradual adjustment and a subsequent inversion.Macroeconomic Adjustment to Monetary Union 21
countries (low interest rate countries) reﬂecting the accumulation of foreign assets/liabilities. In
our model, the real exchange rate (deﬁned as the relative price of non-tradeable goods) follows
exactly the path of aggregate expenditure in both countries. In other words, high interest rate
countries initially experience an upward jump in the real exchange rate followed by a gradual
decline to a level lower than in the initial steady state.
As regards welfare, we presented a very simple and intuitive revealed preference argument to
show that, in our setup, monetary uniﬁcation is welfare-improving for all generations in both
countries. The argument shows that monetary uniﬁcation leads to an expansion of the opportu-
nity set of all generations. It leads to an allocation of resources which is Pareto superior. While
all generations experience a gain in welfare, the extent of the gains differs across countries and
across generations. In our numerical example, the gains in welfare are larger in the former high
interest rate countries and, within the same country, later generations tend to beneﬁt more than
generations born earlier. In line with standard arguments regarding the gains from intertemporal
trade, this pattern can be explained by the fact that, compared to a non-EMU situation, the dif-
ference in the real interest rate facing countries and generations is larger for the foreign country
and, within a given country, in higher for later generations.22 Gabriel Fagan, Vitor Gaspar
Appendix I: Data sources
The main data source for the results presented in Section 2 is the EU Commission’s AMECO
database. The codes for the series employed are as follows: nominal short-term interest rates
(ISN), hnominal long-term interest rates (ILN), the household savings rate (ASGH), nominal
housing investment (UIGDW), the current account balance (UBCA), HICP (ZCPIH), whole
economy net lending (UBLA), general government net lending (UBLG), household net lending
(UBLH), nominal GDP (UVGD) andreal GDP (OVGD). Non housing investment is calculated
as the difference between total investment (UIGT) and housing investment.
The exceptions to the use of AMECO are as follows. The credit to households data came from
the OECD Financial Balance Sheet databank (except in the case of Ireland where the source
was various issues of the Central Bank of Ireland Quarterly Bulletin). The data on net foreign
assets are taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006). The data on the Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP) were taken from Eurostat while the data on relative consumer prices
come from Eurostat’s Comparative Consumer Price Level dataset and relate to price levels
for ﬁnal consumption by private households. For Portugal and Ireland, the data on net lending
shown in Chart 13 are from the Banco de Portugal and the authors own calculations respectively.
Ratios to GDP were calculated by dividing the respective series (as described above) by nominal
GDP. The variables for the core countries were calculated by taking the cross-country arithmetic
means of the respective variables for Belgium, Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands.
Converging country variables were similarly calculated using data for Ireland, Italy, Portugal
and Spain.Macroeconomic Adjustment to Monetary Union 23
Appendix II: Steady state
To determine the post-monetary union steady state we proceed by ﬁrst deriving the steady-state
foreign assets as a function of r and then, using these results, determining the steady-state value
of r. In what follows, let rav = !HµH+!FµF
!H+!F , i.e. the weighted average of the rates of time
preference in the two countries. As regards the ﬁrst step, consider the ﬁxed point of (3.9) as a
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This is clearly a continuous function for r 6= ¡®½. Moreover, for r < µF this is a decreasing









We next examine the steady-state interest rate. From the differential equation for the interest
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Thus, since g(r) is continuous on R, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists an ¹ r, with
µH < ¹ r < rav < µF, such that g(¹ r) = 0. This is the steady-state value of r that we are interested
in.
Combining this result with the results we had for foreign assets, we obtain for this steady state,
since F is a decreasing function of r and ¹ r < rav:
¹ F > 0
In order to determine the effect of interest rate convergence on steady state nominal consump-

























(!H + !F)(µF + ½)(µH + ½)
(r + ½)2(µH ¡ µF)®
< 0
Recalling that rav = !HµH+!FµF
!H+!F . We have shown above that when r = rav, F = 0: At this
interest rate, ®ZH = !H. But this is the level of (nominal) consumption which prevailed in the
pre-EMU steady state. In the post EMU steady state, we know that:
¹ r < r
av
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Using the expressions given in Section 3.1, this also implies that in the EMU steady state, real
consumption, the price of non-traded goods and the consumer price index are all higher than in






with corresponding implications for real consumption, nontraded prices and the consumer price
index in the foreign country.26 Gabriel Fagan, Vitor Gaspar
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Table 1. Difference-in-difference estimates
Variable Coefﬁcient (®3) t-ratio
Nominal short interest rate -2.93 -6.3
Nominal long interest rate -1.62 -3.2
Real short interest rate -2.63 -6.2
Households savings ratio -0.51 -0.4
Housing investment/GDP 1.87 2.9
Non-housing investment/GDP 0.98 1.1
GDP growth rate -0.91 -1.0
Current account balance/GDP -3.81 -2.8
Net foreign assets/GDP -19.12 -2.0
HICP inﬂation -0.29 -0.8
Relative consumer prices 7.92 2.2
Household net lending/GDP -3.05 -2.69
Companies net lending/GDP -1.91 -1.45
General Government net lending/GDP 0.63 0.71
(based on annual data for 1995 to 2005)
Table 2. Welfare Gains from EMU* and expected average real interest rate
Welfare Gains Expected Real Rate
Generation Home Foreign Home Foreign
¡1 to 0 0.05 0.19 4.14 4.66
5 0.05 0.19 4.15 4.63
10 0.05 0.22 4.15 4.61
20 0.07 0.33 4.16 4.56
50 0.17 0.95 4.17 4.45
100 0.32 2.22 4.17 4.32
1 0.50 4.35 4.18 4.18


























Chart 4: GDP growth rate













Chart 6: Housing investment (%GDP)
- - - - Converging countries —— Core countries
The charts display averages for each variable and country group. "Core countries" includes Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. "Converging countries" includes Ireland, Italy, Portu-







Chart 7: Household net lending(%GDP)











Chart 11: Current account balance (%GDP)


















Chart 14: Relative consumer prices (%GDP)
- - - - Converging countries —— Core countries
The charts display averages for each variable and country group. "Core countries" includes Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. "Converging countries" includes Ireland, Italy, Portu-
gal and Spain.Macroeconomic Adjustment to Monetary Union 31
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